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Federal Taxation
by Ben E. Muraskin*
James A. Lawton**
and
Tiffani W. Greene***
Unlike in prior years, in 1996 the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
considered nearly as many cases involving substantive tax law as
procedural tax law. The procedural matters involved waivers of the
statute of limitations for assessment and collection, tax liens and levies,
the disclosure of "return information," and certain procedural requirements for a special use valuation election. Substantive tax issues
decided included trusts as tax-exempt purchasers of insurance, perjury
and tax evasion, split elections for net operating losses, and eligibility for
QTIP treatment.
I. PROCEDURAL ISSUES
A. Waivers of the Statute of Limitations for Assessment and
Collection
The Eleventh Circuit decided two cases involving waivers of the
statute of limitations in 1996. The first involved the revocation by mail
of a waiver of the statute of limitations for assessment. The second
involved a change in the law that extended the statute of limitations for
collection beyond the date set forth in a waiver.
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1986; J.D., 1989): New York University (LL.M., 1990). Student Editor, New York
University Tax Law Review. Clerk to the Honorable William M. Fay, United States Tax
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(B.A., 1990; J.D., 1995).
*** Associate in the firm of Alston & Bird, Atlanta, Georgia. Wake Forest University
(B.A., 1989); Emory University (J.D., 1996). Notes and Comments Editor, Bankruptcy
Developments Journal.

1647

1648

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48

In Coggin v. Commissioner,1 the taxpayer mailed two Form 872-Ts
(Notice of Termination of Special Consent to Extend the Time to Assess
Tax)2 to the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") in an attempt to revoke
his prior consent to indefinitely extend the time to assess tax on his
1980, 1981, and 1982 federal income tax returns that he made by filing
Form 872-A (Special Consent to Extend the Time to Assess Tax).'
Taxpayer mailed the completed Form 872-Ts to the correct IRS office but
failed to address them to the attention of the proper division within that
office.4 Ten months later, the IRS issued a notice of deficiency for the
same taxable years.' The taxpayer argued that the notice of deficiency
was time-barred due to the earlier filed Form 872-Ts.6
In affirming the Tax Court, the Eleventh Circuit held that a taxpayer
must sign and mail a Form 872-T in strict compliance with the
instructions contained on the form in order to terminate a Form 872-A
Special Consent to Extend the Time to Assess Tax.' The court determined that the improperly addressed revocation of waiver was not an
effective "filing" until the proper division discovered the document

1. 71 F.3d 855 (11th Cir. 1996).
2. Form 872-T (Rev. July 1980) allows a taxpayer who previously consented to an
extension of the assessment period to revoke such consent. The Form 872-T instructions
state in relevant part:
If the tax return(s) to which this notice applies is under consideration by the
Examination Division, mail this notice to the District Director of Internal Revenue
having jurisdiction over the return(s), Attention: Chief Examination Division.
If the tax return(s) to which... this notice applies is under consideration by
Appeals, mail this notice to the Chief, Appeals Office, having jurisdiction over the
return(s).
Form 872-T (Rev. July 1980).
3. Form 872-A (Rev. Oct. 1987) allows the taxpayer and the District Director of Internal
Revenue, or the Regional Director of Appeals, to consent and agree to extend the time to
assess tax to anytime on or before the ninetieth day after the IRS receives a properly filed
Form 872-T from the taxpayer.
4. 71F.3d at 859.
5. Id. at 858.
6. Id. The period for assessment of any tax is limited to three years after the return
is filed. 26 U.S.C. § 6501(a) (1994). However, the Commissioner and the taxpayer may
extend this limitations period by entering into a written agreement prior to the original
period's expiration. Id. § 6501(cX4). A properly filed Form 872-T, however, would limit the
extension to ninety days after its receipt by the proper division of the IRS. See supra
note 3.
7. 71 F.3d at 862-63, affg Coggin v. Commissioner, 65 T.C.M. (CCH) 2623,2635 (1993).
See Rev. Proc. 79-22, 1979-1 C.B. 563 (emphasizing that a taxpayer must properly address
Form 872-T in order to terminate a Form 872-A extension).
8. 71 F.3d at 864.
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Consequently, the Commissioner's issuance of a notice of deficiency
within ninety days from the date of discovery was timely.9
In Behren v. United States,10 the Eleventh Circuit addressed the
issue of whether a waiver to extend the time to collect tax binds the IRS
to the date specified in the waiver despite a congressional amendment
extending the statutory collection period past the collection deadline
contained in the waiver. In 1984, the IRS made a timely assessment of
deficiency for the taxpayer's 1974 federal income taxes. 1' In April
1990, the taxpayers and the IRS, pursuant to section 6502(a)(2),"
extended the period for collection of the assessment from November 1990
to June 1991 by signing a Form 900 (Tax Collection Waiver). 1" In
November 1990, Congress amended section 6502' 4 and substituted a
ten-year limitations period in place of the previous six-year limitations
period for the collection of previously assessed taxes."6 The IRS sought
collection of the deficiency in March 1994, after the June 1991 extension
date contained in the waiver but before November 1994, the amended
statutory collection deadline.";
The taxpayers argued against application of the new ten-year
limitations period on the grounds that the June 30, 1991 date set by the
waiver was binding on the IRS.' 7 Citing Florsheim Bros. Drygoods Co.
v. United States,5 a Supreme Court decision rejecting this argument
in a similar context, the Eleventh Circuit noted that waivers have no
effect on Congress' power to amend the statute of limitations.'9

9. I& at 861.
10. 82 F.3d 1017 (11th Cir. 1996).
11. Id. at 1018.
12. See infra text accompanying note 14.
13. 82 F.3d at 1018. Form 900 (Rev. Sept. 1992) allows the taxpayer and the District
Director of Internal Revenue to agree that the specified amount of outstanding tax,
interest, penalties, etc., may be collected from the taxpayer by levy or court proceeding on
or before the date to which the statutory period for collection has been extended.
14. The "Collection after Assessment" statute currently states that if an assessment of
tax has been made within the proper period of limitation, the tax may be collected by levy
or by a court proceeding, but only if the levy is made or the proceeding begun within ten
years after the assessment of the tax, or prior to the expiration of the collections period
agreed upon in writing by the Secretary and the taxpayer before the ten-year period
expires. 26 U.S.C. § 6502 (1994).
15. 82 F.3d at 1018 (citing Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 11317(c), 104 Stat. 1388, 1388458
(1990)).
16. Id. at 1019.
17. Id.
18. 280 U.S. 453 (1930).
19. 82 F.3d at 1019 (citingFlorsheim Bros. Drygoods Co., 280 U.S. at 466 (waivers are
voluntary, unilateral waivers of a defense by a taxpayer which do not rise to the level of
binding contracts)). See also Foutz v. United States, 72 F.3d 802, 805-06 (10th Cir. 1995)

1650

MERCER LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 48

Consequently, a waiver does not bar the IRS from making collections
after the period specified in the waiver where a subsequent statutory
amendment extends the collection period.2"
B.

Tax Liens
In Bilzerian v. United States, 21 the court examined, (i) whether the
IRS can rely on an original assessment to collect taxes paid pursuant to
that assessment but later erroneously refunded back to the taxpayer,
and (ii) whether the mere filing of a suit by the IRS to collect an
erroneous refund is sufficient to validate a federal tax lien. In October
1989, the IRS sent taxpayers a notice of deficiency for taxes, interest,
and penalties relating to their 1985 joint tax return.2 2 The taxpayers
paid the alleged deficiency, filed an amended return claiming a refund,
and actually received the refund in the following year.2
Later,
however, the IRS contended that the refund was due to computer error
and sought recovery of the erroneous refund by filing a claim under
section 7405.24 Before judgment was rendered in the erroneous refund
suit, the IRS fied a federal tax lien against property owned by one of the
taxpayers. 2' The taxpayer requested the lien be released under
section 6325 on the theory that the underlying tax liability was satisfied
when that liability was originally paid.26 After the IRS refused the
request, the taxpayer filed a two-count complaint, one for damages for
failure to release the lien under section 7432,27 and the second seeking

(holding that a Form 900 Tax Collection Waiver is a waiver, not a contract, and applying
the new ten-year statute of limitations after expiration of waiver period); Kaggen v.
Internal Revenue Serv., 57 F.3d 163, 165 (2d Cir.) (same), affd on reh'g, 71 F.3d 1018 (2d
Cir. 1995).
20. 82 F.3d at 1019.
21. 86 F.3d 1067 (11th Cir. 1996), rev g 887 F. Supp. 1509 (M.D. Fla. 1995).
22. 86 F.3d at 1068.
23. Id.
24. Id. The Code section entitled "Action for Recovery of Erroneous Refunds," states
that any portion of tax imposed which has been erroneously refunded may be recovered by
civil action brought in the name of the United States. 26 U.S.C. § 7405 (1994).
25. 86 F.3d at 1068.
26. Id The Code section entitled "Release of Lien or Discharge of Property," states that
the Secretary must issue a certificate of release of any lien imposed with respect to any
internal revenue tax not later than thirty days after the day on which the liability is
satisfied or becomes unenforceable or a bond is accepted. 26 U.S.C. § 6325 (1994).
27. The statute dealing with "Civil Damages for Failure to Release Lien" provides that
if any officer or employee of the IRS knowingly, or by reason of negligence, fails to release
a lien under section 6325, see supra note 26, on property of the taxpayer, such taxpayer
may bring a civil action for damages against the United States in a district court of the
United States. 26 U.S.C. § 7432 (1994).
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preliminary and permanent injunctions ordering the IRS to release the
lien.28
The Eleventh Circuit agreed with the district court's finding that the
original tax liability was extinguished when the 1985 deficiency was
originally paid.29 Therefore, the IRS could not rely on the original
assessment to collect the erroneous refund." However, the Eleventh
Circuit reversed the district court's finding that the mere filing of an
erroneous refund suit by the IRS is sufficient to validate a federal tax
lien. 1 Rather, the proper procedure for the IRS to collect an erroneous
refund is either to prevail on an erroneous refund suit under secnew assessment, including the mailing of a new
tion 7405, or to make
32 a
notice of deficiency.
As to taxpayer's claim for damages, the IRS contended that, based on
the lack of controlling law in the Eleventh Circuit, it honestly and
reasonably did not believe taxpayer's liability had been satisfied within
the meaning of section 7432.' The court remanded the case with
instructions for the taxpayer to demonstrate that the IRS employee
knew, or should have known, that the requirements of section 6325 had
been satisfied.'
Tax Levies
In United States v. Ruff,' the court held a bankruptcy trustee
personally liable to the IRS for a commission paid to a broker after
receipt by the trustee of a Notice of Levy relating to any property of, or
amounts owed to, the broker. In that case, the broker arranged for sale
of certain of the bankruptcy estate's property. Upon consummation of
the sale, the broker sought his commission by filing a fee application
with the bankruptcy court.," In July 1989, before the bankruptcy court
ruled on the broker's fee application, the IRS served on the trustee a
Notice of Levy seeking "[aill property, rights to property, money, credits,
and bank deposits now in your possession and belonging to [the broker]
(or for which you are obligated), and all money or obligations you owe [to
C.

28. 86 F.3d at 1068.
29. I.
30. Id. at 1069.
31. Id., reu'g 887 F. Supp. 1509, 1515 (M.D. Fla. 1995). See also Rodriguez v. United
States, 629 F. Supp. 333, 346 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (holding that section 7405 does not authorize
pre-suit levy procedure).
32. 86 F.3d at 1068.
33. Id at 1070. See supra notes 26 and 27.
34. 86 F.3d at 1070.
35. 99 F.3d 1559 (11th Cir. 1996).
36. Id. at 1562.

1652

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48

d " 7 Because the bankruptcy court
the broker].
had not yet ruled on the
broker's fee application, the trustee responded to the levy by stating that
she held no funds due the broker and that she did not know when the
estate would next owe the broker any money.' Two weeks later, the
bankruptcy court approved the fee application, and the trustee executed
a check payable to the broker.89
The IRS contended that the bankruptcy estate's obligation to the
broker at the time of the levy was property within the meaning of
section 6332(a)' and that the trustee was personally liable for failure
to pay over the commission under section 6332(d)(1).41 The trustee
claimed that when she received the notice of levy, she was not in
possession of property, or rights to property, subject to levy within the
meaning of section 6332(a),4' because the bankruptcy court's approval
of the fee application was a condition precedent to the payment of the
commission."
The court held that under Florida law, the broker had rights to the
commission as soon as the purchaser executed a binding contract to
purchase the property, and that under federal law, the commission was
a fixed and determinable obligation" properly subject to levy because
the broker's underlying performance was complete and the commission
was capable of precise measurement.45 Accordingly, the court held the

37. Id.
38. Id. At the time of the levy, the trustee knew that the bankruptcy court had
scheduled a hearing on the broker's fee application for August 3, 1989. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. "[Ainy person in possession of (or obligated with respect to) property or rights
to property subject to levy upon which a levy has been made shall, upon demand of the
Secretary, surrender such property or rights ... to the Secretary." 26 U.S.C. § 6332(a)
(1994).
41. A person who fails to surrender property subject to levy is personally liable for the
value of the property not surrendered. 26 U.S.C. § 6332(d)(1) (1994).
42. A third party may raise only two defenses for its failure to surrender levied
property to the government. First, the party can show it was not in possession of any
delinquent taxpayer's property within the meaning of section 6332(a). Second, the party
can show that when the notice of levy was received, the property in question was already
subject to a prior attachment. United States v. National Bank of Commerce, 472 U.S. 713,

722 (1985).
43. 99 F.3d at 1563. The broker's commission was not only dependent upon the sale
of the property to his prospective buyer but also upon the subsequent application to, and
approval by, the bankruptcy court. Id.
44. "[A] levy extends only to property possessed and obligations which exist at the time
of the levy. Obligations exist when the liability of the obligor is fixed and determinable
although the right to receive payment thereof may be deferred until a later date." 26
C.F.R. § 301.6331-1(a)(1) (1996). The broker was entitled to a commission equal to onethird of ten percent of the sales price. 99 F.3d at 1562.
45. 99 F.3d at 1563-67.

1997]

FEDERAL TAXATION

1653

trustee personally liable for the value of the commission she failed to pay
over to the IRS.4
D. Disclosure of Return Information
In Ryan v. United States,4 7 the Eleventh Circuit addressed whether
certain financial information gathered from statements of witnesses in
a taxpayer's criminal trial was "return information" within the meaning
of section 6103(b)(2).4 Taxpayer, a criminal defense lawyer who was
indicted and convicted on drug charges and conspiracy to defraud the
IRS in the ascertainment of taxes of other persons, asserted that the
criminal prosecutor illegally released return information by disclosing a
prosecution memorandum to a reporter.4 9 Taxpayer argued that the
disclosure of the memorandum constituted an illegal release of return
information because an IRS agent assisted in the prosecution, and the
memorandum included information contained in the taxpayer's
return.50
The court rejected taxpayer's argument. Recognizing that the purpose
of the statute was to control loose disclosure practices by the IRS, the
court held that the information contained in the memorandum did not
fall within the statutory definition of return information because it was
the work product of the prosecutor and not acquired from the IRS."
E. ProceduralRequirements for a Special Use Valuation Election
In Lucas v. United States (In re Estate of Lucas),'2 the Eleventh
Circuit determined that an estate is not entitled to special use valuation s where the estate neglected to attach a recapture agreement" to
46. Id at 1567.
47. 74 F.3d 1161 (11th Cir. 1996).
48. ld at 1161-62. Return information includes:
[A] taxpayer's identity, the nature, source, or amount of his income, payments,
receipts, deductions, exemptions, credits, assets, liabilities, net worth, tax liability,
tax withheld, deficiencies, overassessments, or tax payments, ... or any other
data, received by, recorded by, prepared by, furnished to, or collected by the
Secretary with respect to a return or with respect to the determination of the
existence, or possible existence, of liability (or the amount thereof) of any person
under this title for any tax, penalty, interest, fine, forfeiture, or other imposition,
or offense.

26 U.S.C. § 6103(bX2XA) (1994).
49. 74 F.3d at 1162.
50. Id. at 1163.
51. Id.

52. 97 F.3d 1401 (11th Cir. 1996).
53. Special use valuation allows qualified real property to be valued for purposes of
calculating federal estate tax according to its actual use rather than its highest and best
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its initial estate tax return." Generally, when a person dies the
highest and best use fair market value for his property is included on his
estate tax return." The special use valuation allows the estate to
value the decedent's property according to the property's actual use,
rather than its highest and best use.67 To be eligible to make the
special use valuation election, the estate must file with the estate tax
return a recapture agreement which generally restricts the heirs' use
and disposition of the property."
The estate argued that, although it failed to attach the recapture
agreement, it had substantially complied with the requirements for
making a special use valuation election and, therefore, was entitled to
relief under section 2032A(d)(3)." s That provision states that an
executor of an estate who makes an election under this section will have
a reasonable period of time (not exceeding ninety days) to cure any
failure to provide required information after being notified of such
failure, but only if the executor initially had substantially complied with
the special use valuation requirements.' Distinguishing the failure to
file a recapture agreement altogether with the filing of a recapture
agreement that merely lacked certain required information or signatures, the court held that there can be no substantial compliance when
a recapture agreement is not attached to the original return.61
II. SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
In 1996, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals decided four cases
involving substantive tax law. The income tax cases involved: (i) trusts
as tax-exempt purchasers of insurance, (ii) perjury and tax evasion, and
(iii) net operating loss elections. The estate tax case involved the
qualification of a QTIP trust.

use fair market value. 26 U.S.C. § 2032A (1994).
54. The recapture agreement is the contract which binds the heirs under state law to
be personally liable to the government for a recapture tax in the event of a premature
disposition of the property, or an early cessation of the qualified use of the property. 97
F.3d at 1404 (citing 26 U.S.C. § 2032A (1994) and 26 C.F.R. § 20.2032A-8(c) (1996)).
55. Id, at 1413.
56. See generally 26 U.S.C. § 2031(a) (1994).
57. 26 U.S.C. § 2032A(dX3) (1994).
58. 97 F.3d at 14031404.
59. Id. at 1406. See 26 U.S.C. § 2032A(d)(3) (1994).
60. 26 U.S.C. § 2032A(dX3) (1994).
61. 97 F.3d at 1406. The court also denied the estate relief under the Tax Reform Act
of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1421(a)(2), 100 Stat. 2085, 2716, by holding that the
recapture agreement falls within the meaning of "information" for purposes of section 1421.
97 F.3d at 1413. ComparePrussner v. United States, 896 F.2d 218, 225-28 (7th Cir. 1990)
(en banc) with Estate of Merwin v. Commissioner, 95 T.C. 168, 181 (1990).
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Trusts as Tax-Exempt Purchasersof Insurance
In Florida Hospital Trust Fund v. Commissioner,2 the
court examined whether three trust funds organized to allow hospitals to "selfinsure" reciprocally, qualified as tax-exempt "cooperative hospital service
organizations" under section 501(e)(1)." In order to accomplish their
stated objective of providing centralized, cooperative insurance services
to their members, the funds were organized as follows: (i) each member
hospital agreed to pool its resources reciprocally to self-insure; (ii) the
funds paid claims made against the member hospitals with the income
it derived from member premiums and investment of the premiums; and
(iii) the funds determined and adjusted each member's premium based
on the member's loss experience."
Affirming the Tax Court's decision," the Eleventh Circuit held that
the trust funds did not qualify as a tax-exempt cooperative hospital
service organization because they did not qualify as a purchaser of
insurance on a group basis under section 501(e)(1)(A)." The court
noted that "the plain meaning of the phrase 'purchasing of insurance on
a group basis' denotes a commercial transaction in which a cooperative
hospital service organization negotiates and executes the purchase of
insurance for its membership as a group.' 7 Because the funds
assumed the same role typically assumed by commercial insurance
companies, the court found the trust funds' transactions, including
determining and adjusting member premiums, to be those of a provider
of insurance and not a purchaser of insurance." Finally, the court
rejected the trusts' argument that applicable legislative history indicated
congressional intent to broaden the scope of qualified insurance activities
under section 501(e) to include the trusts' activities by effectively
A.

62. 71 F.3d 808, 809 (11th Cir. 1996).
63. 26 U.S.C. § 501(eX1) (1994) is the exclusive and controlling section under which a
cooperative hospital service organization can qualify to be treated as a section 501(cX3)
organization, exempt from taxation under section 501(a).
64. 71 F.3d at 810.
65. Florida Hosp. Trust Fund v. Commissioner, 103 T.C. 140 (1994), affd, 71 F.3d 808
(11th Cir. 1996).
66. 71 F.3d at 813. See also Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, Pub.
L. No. 100-647, § 6202(a), 102 Stat. 3342,3730. Congress added the parenthetical phrase
"(including the purchasing of insurance on a group basis)" after the word "purchasing" in
the description of qualified exempt activities under 26 U.S.C. § 501(e)(1)A) (1994).
67. 71 F.3d at 812.
68. Id. at 813. See also id. at 813 n.9 (noting the similarity of the trust's arrangement
to that of a "reciprocal insurance exchange" organization).
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interchanging the phrase "providing insurance" with "purchasing
insurance." 9
B. Perjury and Tax Evasion
In United States v. Mueller,7 the Eleventh Circuit found the trial
record contained evidence sufficient to sustain felony convictions for tax
evasion and perjury where the taxpayer failed to report monies
constructively
received and failed to correct a false statement on his tax
7
return. 1
In Mueller, the shareholders of a corporation voted to liquidate the
corporation. 72 Taxpayer, the majority shareholder and a director of the
corporation, became trustee for the shareholders with the power to
distribute liquidating dividends.7" Evidence that the taxpayer had
control over corporate bank accounts from which money was improperly
removed and uw ccounted for supported findings that (i) such funds were
properly taxable to taxpayer,7 4 and (ii) the taxpayer's willful failure to
report such amounts constituted tax evasion under section 7201.71 In
addition, the taxpayer responded "no" on his individual tax return to the
question of whether he had authority over a foreign bank account,
despite undisputed evidence to the contrary
The government
established that the taxpayer failed to correct the false statement when
he filed an amended return the following year." Accordingly, the court
held that
there was sufficient evidence to find the defendant guilty of
71
perjury.
C.

Net OperatingLoss Elections
Based on the advice of their certified public accountant, the taxpayers
9 attempted to make
in Miller v. Commissioner"
what is called a "split

69. Id. at 813.
70. 74 F.3d 1152 (11th Cir. 1996).
71. Id. at 1155-56.
72. 1d at 1154.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1155 (citing Rutkin v. United States, 343 U.S. 130 (1952) (gain constitutes
income when the recipient has sufficient control over it to derive readily realizable value
from it)).
75. Any person who willfully attempts to in any manner evade or defeat any tax
imposed by Title 26 shall be guilty of a felony. See 26 U.S.C. § 7201 (1994).
76. 74 F.3d at 1156.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. 99 F.3d 1042 (11th Cir. 1996).
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election" with respect to their net operating losses ("NOLs").s" In the
context of NOLs, a split election is an attempt to give disparate
treatment to regular and alternative minimum tax ("AMT") NOLs.
Taxpayers intended their split election to permit them to relinquish the
right to carry back regular NOLs, while retaining the right to carry back
AMT NOLs. 1 The Commissioner issued a notice of deficiency alleging
that the taxpayer's election applied to both types of NOLs and precluded
them from carrying back the AMT NOLs as reported. 2 Although the
law was not clear at the time the taxpayers made the split election, the
taxpayers conceded that, at the time of trial, they were not permitted
under the law to split their carryback period." The taxpayers argued,
however, that their election was invalid, and therefore, they should
retain the right to carry back both the regular and AMT NOLs. s4 The
Eleventh Circuit agreed, finding that because the taxpayers had used
the word "loss' instead of the word "losses" on their election (thereby
referring to regular NOLs, but not AMT NOLs), and because a split
election is not permitted, the taxpayers had caused the election to be
ambiguous and equivocal on its face, and thus invalid.' Accordingly,
the court in Miller held that the taxpayers retained their right to
carryback both the regular NOLs and the AMT NOLs.s"
The court also distinguished Miller from Branum v. Commissioner,7
where the split election precluded the taxpayer from carrying back both
regular NOLs and AMT NOLs. In that case, the taxpayer's attempted
split election contained the word "losses" and the phrase "all losses."

80. Id. at 1043. A taxpayer may offset taxable income by carrying back net operating
losses ("NOL") to each of three preceding years (beginning with the earliest year first), then

to the extent the NOL has not been absorbed, carry it forward to each of the next fifteen
years. 26 U.S.C. § 172(b) (1994). Section 172(bX3) permits a taxpayer to elect to forgo the

three year carryback period and only carry its net operating losses forward. Id § 172(bX3).
81. 99 F.3d at 1043-44.
82. Id. at 1044.
83. Id. See Branum v. Commissioner, 17 F.3d 805 (5th Cir. 1994) (taxpayer unable to
repudiate its earlier split election found to be effective for both types of NOLs where the
election was unequivocal and unambiguous); Powers v. Commissioner, 43 F.3d 172 (5th Cir.
1994) (taxpayer attempted split election was ambiguous and not effective where the

election referenced the wrong section number); Plumb v. Commissioner, 97 T.C. 632, 636
(1991) (ruling that regular NOLs and AMT NOLs could not be split); Rev. Rul. 87-44, 19871 C.B. 3 (section 172(b)(3) election cannot be split).
84. 99 F.3d at 1044.
85. I& at 1044-45.
86. Id. at 1045.
87. 17 F.3d 805, 806 (5th Cir. 1994).
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The plural form of the word was found to be unambiguous and effective
as to both types of NOLs.O
D.

QTIP Election Provisions
In Estate of Shelfer v. Commissioner,5 ' the Eleventh Circuit addressed the issue of whether a trust is eligible for qualified terminable
interest property ("QTIP")O treatment when the surviving spouse does
not control the trust income that accumulates between the date of the
last distribution to the surviving spouse and the surviving spouse's
death ("stub income")." Generally, the estate of the. first spouse to die
is entitled to a marital deduction only if the surviving spouse (i) is
entitled to receive the trust income annually or in more frequent
intervals, and (ii) controls all of the income generated from the trust
property." As a consequence of the estate of the first spouse to die
taking the marital deduction, the surviving spouse's estate is required
to include untaxed property that passed to the surviving spouse."3
Notwithstanding the fact that, in Shelfer, the estate of the first spouse
to die claimed a marital deduction and did not include the value of the
trust in its gross estate, the surviving spouse's estate refused to include
the trust in its gross estate under section 2044,9 on the theory that the
trust did not qualify for QTIP treatment because the surviving spouse
had no control over the stub income."5 The court held the QTIP trust

88. 99 F.3d at 1044-45.
89. 86 F.3d 1045 (11th Cir. 1996).
90. Qualified terminable income interest property is property
(I) which passes from the decedent,
(II) in which the surviving spouse has a qualifying income interest for
life, and
(II) to which an election under this paragraph applies ....
The surviving spouse has a qualifying income interest for life if(I) the surviving spouse is entitled to all the income from the property,
payable annually or at more frequent intervals, or has a usufruct interest
for life in the property, and
(II) no person has a power to appoint any part of the property to any
person other than the surviving spouse.
26 U.S.C. § 2056(bX7)(B) (1994).
91. 86 F.3d at 1046. "Stub income" is defined by the court as the trust income
accumulating between the date of the last distribution and the distributees' death. Id
92. Id.
93. Id at 1048. See Estate of Clayton v. Commissioner, 976 F.2d 1486, 1491 (5th Cir.
1992).
94. The value of the gross estate shall include the value of any QTIP property in which
the decedent had a qualifying income interest for life. 26 U.S.C. § 2044(a), (b)(1XA) (1994).
95. 86 F.3d at 1046. The surviving spouse must be entitled to all of the income from
the QTIP property to make a QTIP election valid. 26 U.S.C. § 2056(b)(7XB) (1994). See
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requirement that the surviving spouse control "all of the income" can be
met despite the fact that trust documents do not grant control over the
stub income to the surviving spouse." Finding the plain language of
the statute ambiguous, the court reached its decision by reasoning that
the two purposes for the QTIP legislation-treating the married couple
as one economic unit and expanding the marital deduction to include
arrangements divesting the surviving spouse of control over property-were best served by not requiring the surviving spouse to control the
stub income. 97
IV. CONCLUSION
Although procedural issues were an important part of the cases
decided by the Eleventh Circuit in 1996, the court addressed more
substantive tax issues than in recent years.

also supra note 91.
96. 86 F.3d at 1053.
97. Id. at 1050.

